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Abstract
Sweden’s economic downturn and growing unemployment in the early 1990s led to
increased uncertainty about banks’ risks. Turbulence in foreign exchange markets and
speculation against the Swedish krona caused significant problems in the housing paper
market. The ensuing banking crisis affected six of the seven largest Swedish banks. Loan
losses peaked in 1992 at nearly SEK 80 billion while the banking sector recorded an
operating loss of almost SEK 50 billion. In the fall of 1992, the government guaranteed all
banks’ liabilities, took over two of the largest banks, and announced it would create the
Bank Support Authority to manage further support measures. Between 1991 and 1993, the
government provided SEK 65 billion in capital injections and loan guarantees, over 98% of
which went to two banks. Capital injections totaled SEK 41.3 billion. The banking sector
recovered, logging modest profits in 1994. Scholars’ estimations of the net cost to
taxpayers of the BSA’s activities vary from 1.5% of 1991 GDP to 2.1% of 1997 GDP, or SEK
35 billion.
Keywords: broad-based, capital injections, broad-based capital injections, Riksbank,
Riksdag, Bank Support Authority

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based capital injection programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial
Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Sweden 1991 Bank Support Authority
(Bankstödsnämnden)
At a Glance
Sweden’s economic downturn and
growing unemployment in the early
1990s led to increased uncertainty about
banks’ risks. Turbulence in foreign
exchange markets and speculation against
the Swedish krona caused significant
financial problems for property finance
companies that relied on the commercial
paper market for their funding (Riksdag
1994). In 1992, unrest in international
currency markets grew following a
Denmark referendum rejecting the
Maastricht Treaty which outlined a
continuing process of EU integration,
including the eventual introduction of a
single currency (Englund 2015; Worre
1995). To defend the krona, the Riksbank
raised interest rates to as high as 500%,
which had an adverse effect on Swedish
banks international funding (Ingves et al.,
n.d.).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: to capitalize eligible banks and credit
institutions through the injection of preferred share
equity.
Announcement Date

December 18, 1992

Operational Date

May 1, 1993

Sunset Date

July 1, 1996

Voluntary vs involuntary

Voluntary

Program Size

SEK 41.3 billion
($6 billion3)

Capital characteristics

Preferred or ordinary
shares

Outcomes

All capital injections went
to two State-owned banks
(Nordbanken and Gota
Bank)

Key Features

Injected capital was

preferred shares
A boom in the banking sector caused by
deregulation preceded the 1992 banking
crisis. Rapid deregulation began in 1983 with the abolition of liquidity ratios, continuing
with the lifting of interest ceilings in 1985 and the abolition of certain currency regulations
in 1989. Lending increased at a rate of 16% per year from 1985-1990, considerably higher
than the previous five years. Real disposable income also increased 10.4% between 1984
and 1987. Given high interest rates on government securities, foreign currency borrowing
increased from 27% of total bank lending in 1985 to 47% in 1990. Thus, the private sector
took on considerable exchange-rate risk (Englund 2015).

By 1989, the unemployment rate hit an all-time low of 1.4%, and consumer prices
continued to rise faster than other EU countries. In 1990, Sweden’s primary stock price
index, the AFGX, fell 37% from its 1989 peak, and, in 1991, commercial property prices
declined 40% (Englund 2015).

3

Exchange rate for USD to Swedish Krona was around 1:7 in December 1992.
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Figure 1: Loan Losses of Bank Groups

Source: Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995.

Figure 2: Total Operation Profit, Banking Sector

Source: Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995.
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The ensuing banking crisis affected six of the seven largest Swedish banks. A currency
crisis and economic recession accompanied the banking crisis; the krona depreciated 25%
and GDP contracted 6% over the three years of the crisis (Ingves et al. 2009; Englund
2015). Loan losses peaked in 1992 at nearly SEK 80 billion while the banking sector
recorded an operating loss of SEK 50 billion (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995). The
average capital ratio across the banking sector was 8.9% by the end of 1992, close to the
8% regulatory minimum (Englund 2015).
In September 1992, during the acute phase of the crisis, the government sought to restore
domestic and foreign investors’ confidence in the banking sector and defend the krona
through an unlimited guarantee of banks’ deposits and other liabilities (Andersson and
Viotti, n.d.). The Ministry of Finance also took over two of the largest banks in the fall of
1992: Nordbanken (now called Nordea) and Gota Bank. However, some banks were still
struggling. The government also determined that the Ministry of Finance was not the
appropriate authority to manage the process. The State decided to make further support
available through a new Bank Support Authority (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995).
The Ministry and the BSA ultimately provided SEK 65 billion in capital injections and loan
guarantees, 98% of which went to two banks (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995). Capital
injections totaled SEK 41.3 billion.4 Only three banks, and two affiliated “bad bank” asset
management companies, ended up receiving capital from the BSA. Nordbanken and its bad
bank, Securum, received SEK 17.3 billion from the Ministry of Finance in 1992. Securum
also received SEK 23 billion through two guarantees from the Ministry of Finance in 1992.
Gota Bank and its bad bank, Retriva, received SEK 24 billion from the BSA in 1993.
Ultimately most large bank groups were able to access the market capital through share
issues, totaling SEK 13 billion, rather than seek government support (Ministry of Finance of
Sweden 1995).

4

This total calculation excludes the guarantees that Securum received, totaling SEK 24 billion.
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Figure 3: Timeline of 1992–94 Crisis

Source: Author.

Summary Evaluation
Securum absorbed Retriva and liquidated most of their combined loan portfolio by mid1994. Securum sold assets in three ways: initial public offerings (IPOs), corporate
transactions outside the stock exchange, and individual property sales. Most sales of
companies and properties were completed in 1995 and 1996, when the real estate market
had recovered (Englund 2015).
In October 1995, the BSA began to sell Nordbanken. The state offered 34.5 percent of
Nordbanken priced at SEK 92 per share. The State received SEK 6.4 billion from the sale
after sales costs (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995). The State sold the remaining
government-owned shares of Nordbanken in 2013 (Englund 2015).
The banking sector recovered and, by 1994, generated modest profits (Ministry of Finance
of Sweden 1995). The depreciation of the krona boosted exports and the economic
recovery, though private consumption did not reach its 1989 levels until 1996. GDP
declined between 1991 and 1993 but recovered by 1994 (Englund 2015).
Scholars’ estimations of the net cost to taxpayers of the BSA’s activities vary from 1.5% of
1991 GDP to 2.1% of 1997 GDP, or SEK 35 billion (Englund 2015).
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Sweden Context 1991–1992
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

$274.4 billion in 1991
$284.3 billion in 1992

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

$31,823 in 1991
$32,801 in 1992

Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)

No ratings data as of 1991 and 1992

Size of banking system

$164.6 billion in 1991
$162.3 billion in 1992

Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP

60% in 1991
57.1% in 1992

Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
system

Data not available in 1991 and 1992

Five-bank concentration of banking system

Data not available in 1991 and 1992

Foreign involvement in banking system

Data not available in 1991 and 1992

Government ownership of banking system

23% in 1995

Existence of deposit insurance

Deposit insurance starting in 1996

Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database;World Bank Deposit
Insurance Dataset; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; La Porta et al. 2002; theglobaleconomy.com.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: The government announced plans to create the BSA on
September 24, 1992, while also announcing a temporary government guarantee
of banks’ liabilities. The BSA became operational on May 1, 1993; before this
date, bank support was handled by the Ministry of Finance.
The government first announced its intention to create a separate bank support authority
in a September 24, 1992, press release. In the same press release, the government
announced a temporary guarantee of banks’ liabilities. The BSA became operational on May
1, 1993 (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995). The guarantee applied to all banks with a
Swedish charter (and their subsidiaries), foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Sweden,
and other credit institutions with a State affiliation (Drees and Pazarbasloglu 1995).
On December 18, 1992, the Riksdag passed legislation creating the Bank Support Authority
(BSA) to manage bank support in light of the banking crisis (Ministry of Finance of Sweden
1995). On the same day, it also passed a bill formalizing the guarantee, assuring that all
banks with a Swedish charter, foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Sweden, and other
credit institutions with a State affiliation could meet their commitments in a timely manner
(Drees and Pazarbasloglu 1995). This temporary guarantee, however, did not constitute a
blanket deposit guarantee; it wasn’t until 1996—after the crisis—that Sweden introduced a
deposit insurance system (Englund 2015).
The BSA became operational on May 1, 1993. Before May 1993, bank support was handled
by the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995).
2. Legal Authority: The BSA drew its legal authority from a December 18, 1992, bill.
The BSA drew its legal authority from a December 18, 1992, bill—1992/93: 135. The
Riksdag approved an additional bill—1993:765—in the spring of 1993. The bill established
a new authority, the Appeal Board for Bank Support Issues, to ensure that support
agreements were consistent with the State’s interest, and to establish an appeals process in
cases where the State and the institution in question could not reach an agreement,
provided the institution would be insolvent without State support. The Act also established
that the State could redeem shares of an institution if an agreement assessed by the Appeal
Board was not accepted, an essential commitment of an agreement was ignored by an
institution, or if the capital base of an institution fell below 2% of assets (Ministry of
Finance of Sweden 1995).
3. Communication: As per a 1993 bill, the BSA was to regularly report to the
government on its activities.
As per a 1993 bill, the BSA was to regularly report to the government on its activities
(Riksdag 1993). The BSA was also required to consult with the central bank (Riksbank),
financial supervisory authority (Finansinspektionen), the Debt Office, and the Swedish
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institutions

4. Governance/Administration: The BSA staff consisted of a Director General, a
deputy Director General, and a board with seven members.
The BSA staff consisted of a Director General, a deputy Director General, and a board with
seven members (including the Director General). The government appointed the Director
General and filled appointments to the board, while the Director General appointed the
deputy Director General, subject to government approval. BSA activities were partially
funded through mandatory fees by the institutions who applied and were approved for
support. According to the BSA’s draft constitution, the Bank Support Board had an internal
audit function that reported to the board. As a government entity, the Board was also
subject to audit by the National Audit Office (Finansdepartementet 1993).
5. Size of the Program: The BSA did not determine the amount of capital available
through the facility at the outset: the support system was to remain in place “as
long as necessary.” The capital injection totaled SEK 41.3 billion. The BSA
injected capital between 1991 and 1993, including Ministry of Finance injections
prior to the creation of the BSA.
The BSA did not determine the amount of capital available through the facility at the outset:
the support system was to remain in place “as long as necessary” (Finansdepartementet
1993). Ultimately, the capital injection totaled SEK 41.3 billion. Nordbanken and its bad
bank, Securum, received SEK 17.3 billion from the Ministry of Finance in 1992. Securum
also received SEK 23 billion through two guarantees from the Ministry of Finance in 1992.
Gota Bank and its bad bank, Retriva, received SEK 24 billion from the BSA (Ministry of
Finance of Sweden 1995).
6. Eligible institutions: The BSA could provide support to any bank with a Swedish
charter, government affiliated credit-institutions, or subsidiaries of either.
Ultimately, only Nordbanken, Första Sparbanken, and Gota Bank received
government support.
The BSA could provide support to any bank with a Swedish charter, government-affiliated
credit institutions, credit institutions owned by a bank with a Swedish charter, and
companies set up as part of a reorganization by an eligible institution
(Finansdepartementet 1993).
Any bank seeking support from the BSA was required to open its books to the Authority.
The BSA, aided by international consultants, analyzed the bank’s credit portfolios and its
future viability. All major Swedish banks, excluding Handelsbanken, entered into
discussions with the BSA, but ultimately only State-owned banks5 received BSA support; all

The State, through State-owned Nordbanken, took over Gota Bank on September 9, 1992, after its parent
company, Gota AB, declared bankruptcy (Englund 2015).
5
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others were supported sufficiently by capital markets. Föreningsbanken entered into a
special agreement with the BSA; this agreement authorized a “capital requirement
guarantee” where the BSA committed to purchasing new equity should the capital ratio of
Föreningsbanken fall below 9%. This guarantee was never used (Englund 2015).6
The banks that ultimately received support from the BSA and the Ministry of Finance (prior
to May 1993) were Nordbanken, Gota Bank, Första Sparbanken, and their affiliated asset
management companies, Securum and Retriva (Drees and Pazarbasloglu 1995). Only
Nordbanken, Securum, Gota Bank, and Retriva received direct capital injection; Första
Sparbanken received an interest subsidy (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995).
Ministry of Finance Interventions in 1991-93
The Ministry of Finance first intervened to help State-owned Nordbanken through a
subscription totaling SEK 4.2 billion of a SEK 5.2 billion new equity issue in 1991 (Drees
and Pazarbasloglu 1995). Through the share subscription, the State’s ownership increased
from 70% to 77% (International.se, n.d.). In 1992, Nordbanken had not recovered, and the
Ministry purchased all outstanding shares of the bank for SEK 2 billion (Drees and
Pazarbasloglu 1995).
The Ministry set up Securum in October 1992 as a bad bank subsidiary of Nordbanken. It
managed around a third of the balance sheet of Nordbanken. Loans and assets with a face
value of SEK 67 billion were purchased by Securum for a price of SEK 50 billion, leaving
Nordbanken with a portfolio of generally sound assets with a face value of SEK 120 billion.
The Ministry capitalized Securum with SEK 24 billion in equity capital through two
guarantees, and additionally provided SEK 10 billion to Nordbanken (Englund 2015; Drees
and Pazarbasloglu 1995). In January 1993, the Ministry purchased all of Securum’s shares
for SEK 1 billion making it independent of Nordbanken and entirely State-owned (Ministry
of Finance of Sweden 1995).
The Ministry, through State-owned Nordbanken, took over Gota Bank on September 9,
1992, after its parent company, Gota AB, declared bankruptcy (Englund 2015).
In the case of Första Sparbanken, the Ministry initially guaranteed an interest-free loan in
September 1991 from the savings bank business (Sparbanksgruppen AB) to the bank
(Riksdag 1994). Sparbanksgruppen, under the agreement, invested SEK 300 million of
equity into the bank and extended a SEK 3.8 billion interest-free loan, which the
government guaranteed. In Spring 1992, the Ministry issued a new guarantee and
transformed the earlier guarantee into a subsidized loan, ultimately costing the State SEK
1.3 billion (Englund 2015).

Recapitalization for Föreningsbanken would have taken the form of nonvoting preference shares. If these
had not been redeemed within a certain number of years, the shares would have been converted to normal
shares with a high voting strength and a high capital-dilution factor (Ingves and Lind 1996).
6
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BSA Interventions post-May 1993
The BSA set up Retriva—another bad bank—in December 1993, to manage distressed
loans from Gota Bank (Englund 2015). The State acquired all shares of Retriva from Gota
Bank for 5 million SEK, concurrent with unconditional shareholder contributions of a
maximum of SEK 20 billion to Gota Bank and SEK 3.7 billion to Retriva, as well as SEK 95
million to Retriva as payment for newly issued shares, and a guarantee for a debenture loan

Figure 4: Bank Support Authority Activities (grey cells=capital injection programs)
Bank

Commitment

Date

Size

Paid out

Institution

Nordbanken

Share subscription

1991

4,191

4,191

MoF

Share purchase

1992

2,055

2,055

MoF

Capital contribution

1992

10,000

10,000

MoF

Securum
AMC Guarantee
(Nordbanken
Guarantee
bad bank)
Share purchase

1992

9,850

9,850

MoF

1992

13,150

13,150

MoF

1993

1,000

1,000

MoF

Gota Bank

1993

20,000

20,000

231

231

1993

3,800

3,800

1993

3,500

-

adequacy 1993

2,500

-

MoF

1,000

1,000

MoF

Capital contribution
Guarantee
shareholder’s equity

Retriva
AMC Capital contribution
(Gota bad bank)
Guarantee
Föreningsbanken Capital
protection
Första
Sparbaken

Interest subsidy

1994

Total cost

BSA

65,277

Total value of
capital injection

41.3

of up to SEK 3.5 billion (Riksdag 1994).
Sources: Englund 2015; Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995.

7. Individual Participation Limits: Individual participation limits were not found.
Research did not reveal any dictated individual participation limits.
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8. Capital Characteristics: Capital generally took the form of preferred shares. The
BSA had the right to convert preferred shares into ordinary shares.
In the case of Nordbanken, the capital injection took the form of share purchases, in 1991
and 1992 (Drees and Pazarbasloglu 1995).
Regulation concerning BSA capital injections allowed the BSA to subscribe for ordinary
shares or shares with a limited voting right (preferred shares). In the case of voting shares,
the BSA was to secure a right to a dividend before existing shareholders. The BSA had the
right to convert nonvoting preference shares into ordinary shares, especially if the
institution did not fulfill its obligations set under the capital injection or to facilitate a sale
of government-owned shares on the market (Finansdepartementet 1993).
9. Existing Shareholders: The BSA could limit dividends to existing shareholders
and implement profit-sharing arrangements.
The BSA could limit dividends to existing shareholders and implement profit-sharing
arrangements (Finansdepartementet 1993). Research did not show if this authority was
used.
10. Existing Board and Management: Prior to May 1993, the Ministry of Finance
replaced management of troubled banks.
The State actively replaced management of troubled banks, forcing the CEOs and chairmen
of Nordbanken and Första Sparbanken to resign in 1990 and 1991 (Englund 2015).
11. Additional Conditions: The Ministry of Finance investigated compensation and
severance packages for senior management of the troubled banks, which
ultimately yielded little legal recourse for adjusting severance pay.
In December 1992, the Ministry of Finance commissioned Prime Minister Bengt Hamdahl
to investigate compensation and severance package limits for senior management of the
troubled banks, especially relating to three former Nordbanken CEOs. On February 3, 1994,
the government adopted new guidelines requiring state-owned banks to include details on
senior management’s future pensions, severance pay, remuneration, and other benefits in
their annual reports. The investigation into the Nordbanken CEOs’ severance pay (so-called
“parachute agreements”) ultimately concluded that the State and banks had little recourse
for adjusting severance pay (Riksdag 1994).
12. Timeframe/Exit Strategy: According to BSA regulation, the BSA was to sell shares
when it was “commercially appropriate” and not according to a specified
timeline. In October 1995, the State first began to sell its shares of Nordbanken.
The State sold the last of its shares of Nordbanken (now called Nordea) in 2013.
According to BSA regulation, the BSA was to sell shares when it was “commercially
appropriate” and not according to a specified timeline (Finansdepartementet 1993). A bill
was introduced to the Riksdag in Spring 1996 to end the BSA guarantee as of July 1, 1996
(Ingves and Lind 1996).
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The government decided to transfer the reconstructed portion of Gota Bank to Nordbanken
in December 1993. As the State owned both banks, the BSA left the capitalization of Gota
Bank to Nordbanken (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995). The BSA also merged Retriva,
Gota’s bad bank, with Securum (Englund 2015).
Securum inherited 3,000 loans from over 700 corporations. Seventy percent of companies
in Securum’s registry chose to file for bankruptcy. In many cases, the organizational
structure of the companies was altered by replacing the CEO or changing the board
composition. Securum sold assets in three ways: IPO, corporate transactions outside the
stock exchange, and individual property sales. Most sales of properties and companies
were completed in 1995 and 1996, when the real estate market had recovered (Englund
2015).
In October 1995, the BSA began to sell Nordbanken. The State offered 34.5 percent of
Nordbanken, priced at SEK 92 per share. The government received SEK 6.4 billion from the
sale after sales costs (Ministry of Finance of Sweden 1995). The State sold the last
government-owned shares of Nordbanken (now called Nordea) in 2013 (Englund 2015).
Scholars’ estimations of the net cost of the BSA’s activities to taxpayers vary from 1.5% of
1991 GDP to 2.1% of 1997 GDP, or SEK 35 billion (Englund 2015).
13. Changes in Existing Regulations: The Riksdag passed legislation after the BSA
was created to enable the BSA’s takeover of Gota Bank.
On the BSA’s first attempt to nationalize Gota Bank, shareholders demanded compensation,
claiming the bank had positive value. A court case concurred with the government’s view
that the bank was insolvent. To avoid a similar occurrence, the government passed new
legislation enabling the BSA to takeover any bank whose Basel capital ratio fell below 2%
(Ingves et al. 2009).
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